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Abstract 
Analysing markets as organisations governed by a network of relational contracts that 
establish rules for market participants increases our understanding of exchange processes. On 
the basis of three land market case studies in Poland, it is shown that market rules are shaped 
by the identity as well as constellation of actors and are designed to serve the common 
objectives of the members of the organisation “market” by decreasing transaction costs and 
protecting group interests. 
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Analysing Agricultural Land Markets as Organisations: 
An Empirical Study in Poland 
1 Introduction 
In much of economics, markets are regarded as anonymous exchange structures and the 
identities of the actors and their constellation on the market are ignored. I argue in this article 
that our understanding of markets can be substantially improved by analysing them as 
organisations where a set of relational contracts between the (potential) participants in 
transactions, the “market constitution”, lays down internal rules for exchange. In this way, 
attention is paid both to the characteristics of market participants and the social structure of 
markets, and the influence of these factors on the design of market rules can be extracted. 
In this article, the content and formation of market rules are studied on the basis of the 
example of agricultural land markets in Poland2. It is shown that, first, rules differ in different 
market settings depending on the actor constellation and, second,  their content is oriented on 
the common interest of the members of the organisation “market”.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical approach to markets 
as organisations and the “market constitution”. Section 3 contains information on the 
empirical setting and methodology. The fourth section shows, discusses, and interprets the 
findings of data analysis. In section 5, the conclusions are presented. 
                                                 
2 To my knowledge, agricultural land markets have not been analysed under the heading of “organisation” before 
(cf. Hurrelmann 2002, 105-115, Hurrelmann 2003). 
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 3
2 Theoretical approach 
In this section, the theoretical background of looking at markets as organisations is presented. 
To this end, in a first part, the idea of markets as organisations is explained, stressing what 
insights the application of the approach can add to current perspectives. In a second part, the 
“market constitution” (i.e. the full set of rules of the organisation market) is discussed further 
by pointing out what aspects of market exchange are likely to be addressed by the rules. 
2.1  Markets as organisations 
Most of economics not only regards markets as anonymous exchange structures, but also 
focuses mainly on the dyadic relationships between partners in transactions instead of 
considering the larger social arrangement within which they act. However, there are 
contributions to market literature that note that “[i]dentity can account for many phenomena 
that current economics cannot well explain” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 715)3 and that the 
multilateral structures of personal relations underlying market transactions need to be studied 
in order to understand exchange processes. The second point is stressed by Granovetter 
(1985) who refers to this as the social embeddedness of exchange. He points out that “the 
anonymous market of neoclassical models is virtually nonexistent in economic life and that 
transactions of all kinds are rife with [...] social connections.” This is illustrated, for example, 
in the work of Bernstein (1992) and can also be extracted from Allen and Lueck’s (1992) 
study on rental contracts on land markets. 
The approach of regarding markets as organisations, brought forward by Furubotn and 
Richter (1998), is able to incorporate identity as well as “embeddedness” reasoning, and 
additionally takes the influence of the institutional setting and more formal features of market 
                                                 
3 Among the contributions of this type relating to land markets are Perry and Robison (2001) who analyse the 
impact of personal relationships on land prices, Sadoulet et al. (1997) who look at the effect of kinship on actors’ 
behaviour in sharecropping contracts, and Alston and Kaufman (2000) who regard racial rent differentials. Ben-
Porath (1980) more generally investigates the role of identity (especially family) in the organisation of exchange.  
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regulation into consideration. At first sight, the combination of market and organisation is an 
unfamiliar approach to institutional economists as usually a clear line is drawn between the 
two concepts “markets” and “organisations” in the literature. Simon (1991), for example, 
distinguishes very clearly between organisations (i.e. firms or bureaucracies) with internal 
contract structures and market transactions that connect these organisations. As another 
example, Ménard (1995, 163) insists that markets and organisations “each [have] unique 
features of their own”. A market is seen as a “specific institutional arrangement consisting of 
rules and conventions that make possible a large number of voluntary transfers of property 
rights on a regular basis, these reversible transfers being implemented and enforced through a 
specific mechanism of regulation, the price system” (Ménard 1995, 170) whereas an 
organisation is regarded as “an institutional arrangement designed to make possible the 
conscious and deliberate coordination of activities within identifiable boundaries, in which 
members associate on a regular basis through a set of implicit and explicit agreements, 
commit themselves to collective actions for the purposes of creating and allocating resources 
and capabilities by a combination of command and cooperation” (Ménard 1995, 172).  
In this article, I contradict this strict division, pointing out that Ménard’s view of markets 
underestimates the importance of actor identities and constellations and of rules that go 
beyond prices and that many features he gives for organisations, such as collectivity, 
identifiable boundaries, regular association and explicit and implicit agreements, are actually 
applicable to markets. In this argument, I am in line with Granovetter who criticises 
institutional economics for overestimating the efficacy of hierarchical power within and 
underestimating the importance of social relations between firms in bringing order to 
economic life. I intend to show that by analysing markets as organisations, we are able to 
focus on features of exchange that would otherwise be disregarded and not understood. 
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The concept of markets as organisations is based on the following ideas. The neoclassical 
expectation that the evolution of markets is an automatic and spontaneous process is rejected 
because of the realisation that economic activity causes transaction costs, especially because 
information does not come for free. Under these circumstances, organised markets, which can 
decrease the costs of repetitive exchange because they establish structures for the 
dissemination of information, have to be established consciously and invested in4: 
Market development necessitates specific investments, which may invite opportunistic behavior on the 
part of members of a cooperative arrangement or of outsiders wishing to free-ride on the market 
organization, a public good. Barriers to entry are therefore not necessarily social waste. Quite the 
opposite, they may be necessary to provide sufficient incentives for the creation or improvement of 
market organization. (Furubotn and Richter, 288-289) 
An organisation is understood as a purposive entity that exists for the benefit of its members; 
it is a structured group of individuals seeking to achieve a common aim such as increasing 
members’ the wealth, income or utility (Furubotn and Richter 1998, North 1990). On the one 
hand, members of the organisation “market” profit because they have reduced transaction 
costs in comparison with unorganised exchange5. On the other hand, however, they are 
limited in their pursuit of self-interest by specific rules set by the organisation “market” in 
order to avoid opportunism. Such rules are necessary because of the fact that the aims of the 
individual participants may not always be in correspondence with that of the entire 
organisation. This constitutes an externality-problem that is solved by having standards 
defining the extent of acceptable pursuit of individual aims. Furthermore, Loasby (2000, 300-
                                                 
4 See Bindseil and Pfeil (1999, 740) on the rise of medievil markets and towns in Germany: “from the beginning 
of market places, these institutions have not been the result of some spontaneous order, but […] various kinds of 
specific investments were always required”. 
5 “Unorganised exchange” refers to transactions for which there does not exist an established set of rules and 
structures favouring repetitive exchange. The result is high transaction costs due to the fact that all the basic 
terms of the exchange have to be determined by the parties prior to the transaction. Thus, this type of exchange is  
likely be used only in occasional transactions whereas markets are designed to facilitate repetitive exchange 
activities. 
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301) points out that markets, once established, take on the characteristics of a public good 
since they reduce the transaction costs of all individuals who use it. In order to avoid this free-
rider problem the individuals who made the original investment in establishing the market 
may want to protect their investments by creating entry barriers (e.g. high costs of entry 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998, 160-161) but also personal, social or cultural barriers (Braun 
1993, 3)). 
To sum up, what are the new perspectives that regarding the market as an organisation 
opens as opposed to more conventional appraoches? In other words: what is the value added 
of analysing markets as networks of relational contracts among a set of actors instead of as 
just another institutional arrangement or governance structure? I see mainly three new 
perspectives that are brought up by the approach. The first is the consideration that all 
participants to a market may strive for a common interest, wheras the usual assumption is that 
in markets, each actor follows solely his individual interest. The second is the belief that both 
the identity and the constellation of actors on the market matter for market activities, whereas 
the usual view is that actors are anoymous and/or only dyadic exchange relations need to be 
considered. The third is the awareness that there may be entry barriers to markets, whereas the 
usual view is that markets are an open playing field where everyone can trade. In short, what 
we gain by regarding markets as organisations is the possibility to understand and analyse the 
interplay going on between actors in the market on the one side and the rules of the market on 
the other.  
2.2 The market constitution 
The set of all the rules that the organisation “market” imposes on its members makes up the 
“constitution” of the market. The market constitution is a network of relational contracts 
between the market participants, which may be formal or informal, explicit or implicit, or a 
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combination of these aspects (Furubotn and Richter). The relation between the parties to a 
relational contract is that of a “minisociety with a vast array of norms beyond those centred on 
the exchange and its immediate processes” (Macneil 1978, 901). It is important to note that 
the “markets as organisations” approach recognises that the formation of organisations itself 
takes place within the larger institutional setting of a state (i.e. the legal system as well as 
general moral standards) creating restraints as well as incentives (cf. North). 
The design (i.e. the structure and content) of the relational contracts that govern the 
organisation “market” is a product of the characteristics of actors who are members as well as 
their constellation. Scharpf (1997) divides actors’ characteristics into orientations and 
capacities. Orientations include both the perception human beings have of the world around 
them and their preferences (i.e. the composition of their utility functions). An actor’s 
capacities are based on his possession of resources, the “human-made capital” by which 
Ostrom (2000) refers to physical, human and social capital. The constellation of actors is 
determined by the composition of the group of actors and the positions they occupy in relation 
to each other. Thus, it matters whether the relationships between members are hierarchical or 
among equals, whether the relationships are cooperative or competitive, personal or 
anonymous, and so on. 
An important aspect concerning the market constitution is also who establishes the rules 
and has the competence to enforce them. Establishing rules, for example, could be done by 
special market bodies (formally or informally legitimated) that are equipped with decision-
making rights, or they could be in the hands of all members as a collective. Enforcement 
could be in the hands of the central legal system of the state, but it may also be carried out by 
members or some governing body. 
The option of establishing and enforcing rules by a collective of all members of the market 
is likely to be feasible only in small markets (Aoki and Hayami 2001, Brezinski and Fritsch 
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1997). In this case, markets and communities may coincide, whereby community is defined as 
a group of mutually identifiable agents who interact repeatedly in a certain economic and 
social setting, characterised by high entry and exit costs (Bowles and Gintis 1998, Aoki and 
Hayami 2001, Aoki 2001). In the literature on communities, it is pointed out that they 
“generate and uphold the endogenous, self-enforcing rules of action choices through repeated 
interactions in order to regulate the possible moral hazard behavior of community members” 
(Aoki, 100), so called “community norms” (Aoki). In this way, free-rider problems are 
reduced and cooperative behaviour is encouraged (Bowles and Gintis). 
The market constitution is likely to contain rules pertaining to various transaction 
activities. For the analysis in this paper, I have structured them into three groups: 
dissemination of information, control procedures, and enforcement mechanisms.6. In all three 
categories, the topics covered by rules must include how as well as who: how is information 
distributed and who is responsible for it, how is the behaviour of actors is controlled and who 
controls, how is wrongdoing sanctioned and who carries out the punishment. 
Most interesting with respect to the dissemination of information is the question of what 
rules exist in the organisation “market” on distributing information about the general options 
for trade (i.e. the possibility of buying, selling, renting, etc.). A limited and directed 
dissemination could exclude outsiders from making use of the common good “market” and 
constitutes an important entry barrier. Control procedures establish how members of the 
organisation “market” ensure that they are informed about relevant behaviour of other 
members, which is necessary to allow for sanctioning but also to make it possible for actors to 
build up reputations that facilitate exchange. Rules are set for how information about market 
participants is collected and how it is made available to others members of the organisation, 
                                                 
6 Furubotn and Richter (285) consider six basic transaction activities: search, inspection, contracting, execution, 
control and enforcement. My categorisation basically corresponds to this and only draws together some terms. 
Search corresponds to my “dissemination of information”, inspection, contracting, execution and control are 
captured under “control procedures” and enforcement is “enforcement mechanisms”.  
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concerning both whether actors fulfill the market contracts they entered into and whether they 
behave in accordance with the standards set in the “market constitution”. The available 
enforcement mechanisms depend heavily on the type of rules. Formal rules can be enforced 
through courts whereas informal standards have to rely on social sanctioning7 by other 
members of the market or through internally-enforced standards of conduct based on 
internalised norms and values of the actor (cf. North). 
3 Empirical setting and methodology 
This paper is based on empirical data from three village case studies in Poland. Poland 
provides excellent preconditions for carrying out a comparative study on different actor 
constellations on the land market due to the fact that, in contrast to other Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs), only about 20% of the land was farmed by state farms during 
communist times and these farms were only present in certain regions of the country; only 4% 
of the land was farmed by cooperatives. Most of the territory was dominated by small scale 
individual farming (GUS 1991). At the time the empirical investigations of this study were 
carried out (1999 and 2003), the process of privatisation of state land was under way, carried 
out by the Agricultural Property Agency of the State Treasury (AWRSP)8 which, after its 
creation in 1992, took over state farm land with the aim of selling it off. However, as of the 
end of 2001, land actually sold by the agency comprised only 23% of all agency land. The 
                                                 
7 Social sanctioning means that an individual’s non-conformity to the rules of the group it belongs to is punished 
by other members through expressions of social disapproval and ultimately even ostracism. The success of this 
kind of enforcement is critically dependent on a “thick” definition of actors’ interests wherein utility is gained 
not only from monetary benefits but also from social goods such as status and the avoidance of social 
disapproval (Nee and Ingram 1998). Sugden (1989, 95) believes that, although rarely considered by economists, 
the desire for approval is “at least as fundamental as the desire for most consumption goods” and that this is not 
surprising given the nature of humans as “social animals”. 
8 AWRSP (Polish name Agencja Wlasnosci Rolnej Skarbu Panstwa) was replaced in 2003 by the Agency for 
Agricultural Property (ANR – Agencja Nieruchmosci Rolnych), which has some extended rights and 
responsibilities. This does not have any effect on the results of this study, however, since all the land transactions 
regarded took place before this change. 
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rest was either rented out or cultivated under management or administration contracts 
(IERiGZ 2002). 
For this study, two regions were selected where different land market settings with respect 
to the actor constellation were present. The first area chosen was the territory of the former 
voivodship Poznan9 in western Poland where a substantial portion of the land was farmed by 
state farms in coexistence with individual private farms. Today, these family farms, which are 
larger that the Polish average, still exist. State farm land has partly been sold or rented out to 
either individual farmers or larger private commercial farming enterprises and is partly 
managed under management contracts. The second area is the former voivodship Sieradz in 
central Poland, where state farms used only a minor part of the territory. Both under 
communist rule and today, the area is dominated by small-scale individual family farms. 
In these two regions, altogether three village case studies were carried out in the autumn 
and winter of 2003, two in the Poznan region (villages referred to as P1 and P2) and one in 
the Sieradz region (referred to as S). The cases were selected to provide an interesting basis 
for a comparative study of land market organisation. In the villages, altogether 37 interviews 
with landowners and land users were conducted with a questionnaire composed of open 
questions based on a manual that addressed different areas of land market activity (sale, 
renting in, purchase, renting out). In addition, two interviews with members of the local 
administration (gminas) were made, addressing the gminas’ role in land transactions and the 
state of the privatisation process in the region10. The timeframe set for the analysis of land 
market activity were the years since the system change in Poland in 1989 until 2003.  
In a short summary, the three selected villages can be characterised in the following way. 
P1 is a village of around 340 inhabitants, of which some are not employed in farming but only 
                                                 
9 There was a reform of the voivodships (largest administrative units in Poland) in 1999 reducing their number 
from 49 to 16. The study regions referred to in this article are the territories of the old voivodship Poznan 
(westen Poland) and Sieradz (central Poland). 
10 Gminas are the smallest administrative unity in Poland. Since villages P1 and P2 were located in the same 
gmina, only two administrations were relevant in this study. 
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reside there. The farms are rather large by Polish standards (average 26 ha11) and to a large 
extent specialised in rearing pigs and growing vegetables and sugar beets. Some farmers are 
involved in a vegetable producers’ group, and there is talk of setting up such a group for pigs 
as well. A section of a cooperative that stretches over various villages is located in P1, but the 
management resides in another location. The P1 section of the cooperative has been losing 
members (and with them their land) and has been selling off its own land since 1989. None of 
the land belonging to the village territory has ever been incorporated into a state farm, but 
numerous state farms did exist in the vicinity, including many of the neighbouring villages. 
P2 is a village neighbouring P1, with about 230 inhabitants. A state farm used to exist here 
that used part of the territory of the village, but there have also always been private family 
farms, today averaging around 33 ha of land. There is a specialisation in pigs and vegetables, 
and the same contacts with producers’ groups as in P1 exist. The privatisation agency 
AWRSP has rented out most of the state farm land and sold a small part. A Spanish firm has 
bought and rented some of this land for the production of asparagus and strawberries. Other 
land has been rented by individual farmers or by farmers organised into informal user groups. 
An element of the population of the village consists of former workers of the state farm who 
do not own land and (if not working for the Spanish firm) are largely unemployed. 
S is a village of roughly 200 inhabitants. All the farms here are private family farms that 
are rather small (average 14 ha) and in most cases unspecialised. Almost every farmer  
produces some milk, which is the village’s main product, but also pigs and poultry are reared 
and cereals grown. No producers’ associations exist. People complain about the poor land 
quality and claim that their village is “the poorest in the area”. State farms did not exist in the 
close vicinity of S, and there is no land available for privatisation efforts anywhere nearby. 
                                                 
11 The average farm size in Poland is 7.2 ha, whereby the smallest farms are located in the south and east of the 
country (European Commission 2002). The average sizes given for the three villages are calculated from the land 
used (own and rented) by the farms of active private farmers who were interviewed. Since they are based on a 
small sample, they only have indicative character. 
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4 Results and interpretation 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical study are presented and discussed. The focus is on 
what land market rules were found to exist in the three case study villages, where there are 
similarities and where differences, and how these features can be explained. The leading 
question is oriented on the issues raised in the theoretical chapter: what are the rules for the 
dissemination of information, control procedures and enforcement mechanisms? Special 
attention is paid in the analysis to the issue of who is responsible for establishing these rules. 
4.1 Passing of information 
Table 1 gives an overview of the composition of actors in the three cases on the 
selling/renting out side and on the buying/renting in side. It becomes clear that in all three 
villages private farmers are active in sale and rental and that in villages P1 and P2 non-private 
actors (gmina, cooperative, AWRSP, farming company) also appear on the land market. The 
transactions carried out by these actors show particular characteristics. 
The privatisation agency AWRSP rents out land on the basis of formalised contracts that 
are usually established for a long term (10 years) and are based on a public tender procedure 
in which the rental contract goes to the tenant who offers the highest price. Offers for 
possibilities for renting are published by AWRSP in the press and also in the local gmina 
office. AWRSP can also sell land, for which the procedure is similar to rental, but in the areas 
regarded here, this is currently not happening because of unclear property rights12, and there is 
only one case in P2 where land was actually bought from the agency. Land from the 
                                                 
12 There are two sources of insecurity about property rights. One is that there is a German family that used to 
own large estates (including the area of the former state farm in P2) in the area before WWII, and there is 
considerable fear that this land will be claimed back. However, there does not seem to be any indication of such 
attempts by the family and the legal basis for claims of this kind is not strong. The second source is likely to be 
more serious. The Polish supreme court recently decided that Poles who had to emigrate after WWII from the 
eastern parts of the country that were taken over by the Soviet Union are entitled to indemnity payments. There 
seems to be a plan in the government to make some of these payments in-kind, in the form of land currently 
administrated by AWRSP/ANR. 
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privatisation agency is usually sold in large plots, making it unattractive to individual farmers 
to rent and rather favouring commercial farming companies like the Spanish producer in P2. 
However, some of the farmers interviewed in P2 circumvented this problem by forming 
unofficial co-operations in which up to 25 farmers rent a large plot together (but only one of 
them figures officially as the tenant) and subdivide it between themselves without a formal 
contract. In some cases, where smaller plots of land are concerned, AWRSP employs the 
gmina as a mediator, and the farmers rent directly from there. Such offers are published in the 
gmina office on a notice board. 
As far as land sales from the cooperative in P1 are concerned, the plots were offered 
directly to some farmers from P1 by the director of the cooperative, who indicated clearly that 
in order to have the chance to buy, the interested party would have to pay him a bribe of 20% 
of the purchase price. 
With respect to individual private participants in land transactions, all actors on the 
buying/renting in side are active farmers who buy or rent in to increase the size of their farm. 
It needs to be mentioned that both in P1 and P2 (i.e. the villages located on territory that was 
German before WWI), there is some fear of former German owners demanding land back. In 
all three villages there is also the idea that foreigners may come and buy land on a large scale, 
especially after Poland’s EU-accession. There are rumours and actual occasions that, in 
villages in the vicinity of P1 and P2, foreigners have already bought land through cooperation 
with Polish partners. Concerning the private individuals on the selling/renting out side, the 
most important group is also that of farmers and former farmers. In the first case, the usual 
reason for selling/renting out are acute financial problems that force a farmer to resign from 
part of his land, while, in the second, land is usually sold or rented out by an owner who gives 
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up farming in exchange for a pension13. Other less important sources of land are private 
individuals who live and own land in the village but do not farm it themselves, as well as 
private landowners who do not reside in the village, such as heirs of former owners. The 
empirical observations show some remarkable differences in the way land transactions occur 
between private individuals in the three case study settings, centered around how information 
on land transfers is distributed. 
However, these differences concern only land purchase transactions, while for rentals the 
procedures are similar everywhere. In rental transactions, the landowner communicates his 
willingness to rent out orally to only one known person (which may be a neighbour, someone 
else from the same or a neighbouring village, or family) who he has reason to expect is 
interested in renting in. In all recorded cases, the person first approached accepted the offer to 
rent in. No wider distribution of information nor the possibility of a number of interested 
parties making competing offers was present. It should also be noted that the initiative for 
land rentals comes from the owner, not from a prospective tenant. Only one exception 
occurred in S, where an innovative farmer approached two owners, one an absentee 
landowner and one a known drunkard, whose fields had been lying idle for some time. The 
exceptional character of this process, however, becomes apparent since the farmer mentions 
that “everybody could see these fields had been idle for a long time and no one else did 
anything about it”. The rental contracts set up in such deals are sometimes oral and often 
adjusted to the specific situations of the landowner and tenant (e.g. giving the possibility to 
fine-tune the rental price each year or give the choice between payment in-kind or money). 
The initiative for land sales, as for rentals, comes from the selling side. The variations in 
the procedures of purchasing and selling land between the villages look as follows. In S, the 
process mirrors exactly that for renting out: a neighbour or other close person from the same 
                                                 
13 To qualify for a pension from the agricultural social insurance fund KRUS, a farmer has to give up 
agricultural production, which means he either has to sell his land, pass it on to children or other heirs, or rent it 
out under a long term (10 years) contract to non-relatives. 
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village is approached with the information that land is to be sold. The price, agreed on largely 
without bargaining, is what the villagers refer to as “the market price” by which they mean 
the price that has been paid for land of a similar quality in a recent transaction in the area. In 
P1, there is not one procedure of information distribution, but various possibilities coexist, 
one farmer we interviewed noting that “there is no rule about how land transactions go (here), 
everybody does it his own way”. Some sale transactions in P1 were initiated in the same way 
as in S, by an offer to one known person. The majority, however, relied on a wider spread of 
information that is carried by word of mouth to other farmers in the village and neighbouring 
villages. One farmer said, “You cannot escape receiving the information about land that is on 
offer”. This starts a process of bidding whereby all interested potential buyers privately make 
their offer to the seller, and the land finally goes to the one who offers the highest price. In 
one exceptional case in P1, a farmer offered his land for sale in a newspaper advertisement 
and, in a bidding process, finally sold the plot to a farmer from far away whom nobody from 
the village knew, receiving the highest price recorded for land on the village territory. This 
recent event is much discussed throughout P1, and some of the village’s farmers express that 
they find it uncomfortable and surprising that others do not care to whom their land goes. The 
local bidder who lost out on the purchase (and who had been renting in the concerned plot 
before) actually feels cheated. Other farmers acknowledge that the sale in this way is 
acceptable because “in the end, the price is what counts”. In P2, all but one purchase 
transaction between private individuals worked through word-of-mouth spread of 
information, leading to competing offers by interested local parties. It has to be mentioned, 
though, that the overall occurrence of private sales in this village is much lower than in P1 
and S, and the predominant transaction activity here is rental from AWRSP. 
The striking differences in the ways in which land sales work in the three villages can be 
explained by the influence of the presence of non-private actors on the land markets in P1 and 
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P2. In both villages, in contrast to S, many sales among privates work with a competitive 
system based on price offers, which indicates that it is largely accepted to try for as much 
revenue out of a land sale as possible. It can be inferred from this that the commercial and 
profit-based attitudes on which non-private actors base their land market activities (tender 
procedures and seeking personal gain) have an impact on the standards for private actors who 
interact in the same area. One farmer from P2 even declared that he would prefer to have land 
transactions with people he does not know so as “not to mix personal and business issues”. 
The stronger the “business-oriented” example of land transactions in the village, the stronger 
the influences appear to be, since in P2 bidding is the absolutely predominant process in 
private land sales, while in P1 there is still a certain mix between more and less competitive 
ways of transacting. A further reason for the observations made may lie in the fact that the 
private farmers in P1 and P2 have a generally more commercial orientation that those in S, as 
indicated by the higher degree of specialisation and the activities in the area such as setting up 
producers’ groups. 
In is important to note, though, that even in the more commercial land transactions, the 
overwhelmingly used way of transferring information (i.e. word-of-mouth) limits competition 
for land to the group of actors that can be reached by the process. This quite efficiently 
excludes such people as foreigners or interested parties from villages further away or from 
other regions. In this way, sellers actually forego the possibility of receiving even higher 
prices by opening up the offer to an even larger assemblage of competitors. Thus, on the 
whole there still seems to be a certain desire to keep land transfers inside a group of actors 
that one is familiar with, Polish private farmers from the same area. I interpret this in the way 
that complete strangers (and especially foreigners) are viewed by majority opinion as a threat 
to the village community. The reactions to the case in P1 where land was sold to a stranger 
reported above support this thesis, as well as some comments of villagers on the possibility of 
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strangers/foreigners buying land in their village. Thus, one person said that other villagers 
would be “shocked” if she sold her land to foreigners, and another declared, though half-
jokingly, “we are hostile to strangers”. A third person believed that “foreigners would not 
have a chance to buy” because the locals would not let them and, indeed, many people stated 
that they “would never sell to foreigners”. However, the fact that some people stress that they 
personally would not have anything against strangers and/or foreigners buying in the village 
and that some people in P1 did not blame the farmer who sold his land through an ad is 
evidence that there are some ambiguities in the rules and they are possibly in a process of 
change as the country opens up. 
There seem to be two main reasons why the differences in the three cases with respect to 
land purchases do not appear where land rental is concerned. The first is that someone who 
rents out his land has an interest in it being treated according to good farming standards to 
avoid damage to the soil. Thus, the owners prefer to rent to someone they trust and would 
rather pass up a higher rental price than rent to a risky tenant. As one farmer said, “You do 
not know how outsiders would treat the ground”. This is not a concern where land that is sold, 
since here the risk lies solely with the new owner. The second reason is that rental 
transactions are usually not primarily motivated by the aim to get a good income, but tend to 
serve as a temporary solution before the owner sells or passes land on to heirs, so, making a 
“good deal” is less important than passing the land into trustful hands for a transitional period. 
The observation that, as a rule, land transactions (purchase as well as rental) are initiated 
by the landowner and not an interested buyer or tenant may indicate that it is regarded as an 
unacceptable indication of disrespect for another actor’s qualities as a farmer to approach him 
and offer to rent or buy his land. Since such an event could cause considerable unrest in the 
community, not least because other farmers might fear that their land and dignity might come 
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under attack too, the existing arrangement seems to contribute to ensuring harmony in the 
group. 
4.2 Control procedures and sanctioning mechanisms 
With respect to control procedures and enforcement mechanisms, the similarities between the 
villages are much more pronounced than in the area of passing information. Most 
observations apply either to all three villages or are derived from a particular situation only 
present in one of the studied cases. 
As far as control control processes are concerned, the situation described above, that rental 
contracts are always made with a close person and purchase contracts rarely involve anyone 
from outside the same extended community, makes effective monitoring easy. Information on 
people’s reputation is exchanged within the community, and everybody has the possibility to 
know who ever defaulted in a contract, did not stick to an agreement, tried to cheat, and so on. 
In all three villages I observed that information about who had bought, sold or rented land 
from whom, when and for what price, with which problems, and so on was essentially public 
knowledge (cf. also Macours 2002). Due to this situation, even if an exchange partner is not 
known well personally, there are enough reliable informants on his former activities and 
behaviour. Moreover, the transaction costs involved in acquiring any relevant information on 
the matter are extremely low since this information usually does not even have to be sought 
after, but is passed on during other exchange or activities, as in the local shop, in a chat 
between neighbours or at a family meeting. In dealing with a stranger (i.e. someone whose 
reputation is unknown to both the transaction partner and the wider community), transaction 
costs in search of reliable information on this person’s credibility would necessarily be much 
higher.  
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Another indication of the fact that community control mechanisms are in place and are 
relied on in private land transactions can be found in the unofficial co-operations of farmers in 
P2 who rented land from AWRSP. In these arrangements, both the person who is the official 
tenant and the (sometimes numerous) unofficial co-tenants need to have substantial amounts 
of trust for each other. Thus, the official tenant must be sure that all other partners make their 
rental payments (which he has to collect and pass on to AWRSP together with his own share) 
on time and that they adhere to the rather strict rules on soil protection that the privatisation 
agency sets in their standard contracts, a violation of which can lead to heavy fines or the loss 
of the rented land. The co-tenants have to be able to rely on the continuity of the agreement 
for the full rental term even if (e.g. through the death of the official tenant) disturbances 
occur. Furthermore, they must be sure, after the contract is closed, of actually getting the 
exact piece of ground agreed on beforehand. Finally, when area payments start with Poland’s 
accession to the EU, the co-tenants must be ready to rely on getting their fair share of these 
payments, the whole amount of which will go directly only to the official tenant. The 
potential for conflict in these unofficial tenure arrangements is, in fact, so great that a gmina 
official I interviewed in the gmina of P1 and P2 expressed his astonishment at the fact that the 
farmers do not chose to form official land users’ co-operations. Such a solution is possible 
under Polish law and would make it possible to settle the allocation of land, the continuity of 
the arrangement and the distribution of area payments in a way that would make the legal 
enforcement of claims possible. However, the farmers taking part in the arrangements as they 
are seem to trust the control mechanisms present, which rely on peer monitoring and the 
sharing of information inside their group. It is hard to imagine how the unofficial groups 
could work if people from outside the community, whose reputation is unknown and whose 
behaviour cannot be easily monitored, were to take part in it. 
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In general, the fact that the control procedures used in land transactions among private 
farmers in the case studies are extremely transaction cost efficient can be interpreted as 
another reason why the large majority of land exchanges does not involve strangers to the 
community at all. 
Enforcement, in all three case studies, relies on self-enforcement and social sanctioning. In 
none of the regarded cases have any official sanctioning bodies such as courts been involved 
in solving conflicts. Actions of social sanctioning are of a subtle kind that aims at an actor’s 
reputation rather than inflicting physical violence or material consequences on the person who 
violated rules. A clue as to how sanctioning works can be taken from the answers received to 
the interview question “How do you think other people from your village would react if you 
sold your land to a foreigner?”. Many people said that there would be anger in the community 
that would probably not be expressed through physical aggression or direct threats, but rather 
more delicately. “They would gossip about me” or “People would talk badly about me in 
church” are typical answers. There is no evidence that deviators would have to fear material 
consequences, although, especially in situations where farmers cooperate, this theoretically 
seems possible (e.g. by excluding a farmer from a producers’ groups or informal land user 
group). Even the seemingly mild expression of disapproval found in the studied cases, 
however, seems to have a discouraging effect in a community where people are in close daily 
contact and their reputation is an important asset in dealing with each other. 
However, the need for sanctioning is rarely given, since land market rules seem to have 
largely been internalised by the actors. This is illustrated by the fact that a frequent first 
reaction to the above mentioned question on the reaction of the village to foreigners buying 
land was the declaration that the question itself is irrelevant because such a situation was 
impossible since they “would never sell to a foreigner” simply because they felt that this 
would not be correct. Furthermore, the interviewed gmina official informed me that disputes 
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about land transactions had never been brought before him, although in many other cases of 
disagreements between farmers he is involved as a mediator. He regarded this as an indication 
of there not being any serious disagreements about land matters. Of course, the observation 
could also be a sign that the land market rules are of a very implicit kind so that neither 
official laws nor even a local official would have any basis for intervention. The farmer from 
P1 who sold his land to a stranger, for example, obviously only exercised his good right 
according to any conceivable legal standards; still his action was disapproved of by at least a 
substantial part of his community. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper set out to demonstrate that insights can be gained by analyzing markets as 
organizations. I argued that, in particular with respect to finding out about the common 
interests of market participants, the entry barriers to the market and the influence of the actor 
constellation, the approach opens up new perspectives and a better understanding of what is 
really happening of markets. The issue was investigated empirically by taking a close look at 
the rules of land markets (the “market constitution”) in different land market settings, asking 
what the rules consist of and who makes them. In this last section, I give a summary of the 
main findings from the land market case studies and then finish with a discussion of whether 
the idea of markets as organizations applies to other markets as well or has to be considered 
as limited to specific markets. 
The main results are that in all three studied villages the land markets show characteristics 
of organisations in that there are relational contracts between the private farmers who 
participate in land transactions that establish internal rules on how to conduct land market 
exchange. The rules promote the common objectives of members, ensuring the balance 
between the members’ pursuit of self-interest and the goals of the organisation as a whole. 
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Two important objectives are followed. The first is to protect the community from negative 
outside influences in the form of strangers or foreigners acquiring land. This is done by 
erecting an entry barrier to the market that is based on passing information selectively only to 
members of the community. The second is to guard against an explosion of land prices that 
would exclude many local buyers from participation in land transactions. This is achieved by 
allowing for bargaining only within a local group or no bargaining at all. Another important 
finding is that rules are designed in a way that generates very low transaction costs for 
information, control and enforcement within group of members. Opening up the market to 
strangers would likely increase these costs substantially. 
The results also confirm that the constellation of actors in the particular market has a 
considerable impact on the design of the rules, as certain contents of rules differ between the 
three studied land market settings. The main difference lies in the accepted extent to which 
actors are allowed to follow their self-interest within the rules of the organisation land market 
with respect to receiving a high price in land sale transactions. Due to the fact that the area of 
two case study villages (P1 and P2) witnesses numerous land transactions involving non-
private actors, farmers here are used to a much more commercial and profit-oriented approach 
to land exchange. Consequently, they also find it acceptable to drive prices for land up in 
bargaining processes between private farmers. In the village where such commercial 
influences are missing (S), bargaining for land prices is not practiced at all. Table 2 sums up 
how the most important characteristics of market organisation (common rules, common 
objectives, influence of actors’ identity and constellation) are manifested in the three case 
studies. 
The relational contracts regulating the land markets carry a strong element of “community 
norms” in that they are established informally through repeated interaction within a mutually 
identifiable set of actors, enforced through social sanctioning of the group or self-enforcing, 
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erecting entry barriers for outsiders and discouraging opportunistic behavious. Furthermore, 
the agreements are implicit in the way that actors do not carry a mental list of these rules in a 
universally accepted, concise and clear form, but rather are conscious of them in a more vague 
and general way. Sometimes, there are ambiguities about rules within the group of members 
of the organisation market, which might indicate that the norms are in a process of adjustment 
to new social and market situations. 
This leads over to the question of whether land markets are special cases of markets that 
are unique in corresponding to the idea of markets as organisations because of their relative 
closedness (and, consequently, smallness), personalised and informal structures, and 
“community rule” features. My answer is, first, that it is certainly correct that the markets I 
analysed in my case studies are specific (with respect to their type, their location and many 
other features), just as every single market is specific. However, second, it is not the specific 
features that I observed in these markets that make markets into organisations. 
Organisations do not necessarily have stable, small membership (if trade among many is 
seen as beneficial to the objectives of the organisation, there may be no barriers at all), the 
establishment and enforcement of rules does not have to take place jointly by all members, 
and the market constitution can have a completely formal character. The defining idea is, as 
pointed out in the theoretical part of this article, that the group of participants is structured by 
rules, the identity as well as the constellation of actors matters and the participants have 
common objectives. In many markets, their objectives may as well be mostly about reducing 
the transaction costs of exchange among actors and, thus, contributing to their income. 
However, I do believe that when economists approach various kinds of markets with an open 
mind they will often find common aims that go beyond pure and immediate economic gains. 
To illustrate my point, let me take the example of stock markets, which are undoubtedly 
completely different from agricultural land markets but, also undoubtedly, very organised: 
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there is a firm structure of rules (formal, in this case) for all participants in the market, there 
are strict entry barriers for actors, and there are common objectives (lowering transaction 
costs through special trading systems, but maybe also acquiring/keeping up a certain prestige 
or status). 
In order to come to a final evaluation of what economic theory and practice has to gain by 
analysing markets as organisations, more empirical evidence is certainly required. However, 
the findings of this study give reasons to expect that more attempts along the same line have 
the potential to lead to new perspectives on markets and increase our understanding of 
exchange processes. 
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Table 1: Composition of actors on the selling/renting out side and on the 
buying/renting in side in the three case study villages 
Village Selling (s)/renting out (ro) Buying (b)/renting in (ri) 
P1  (former) Private farmers (s + ro) 
Other private owners from village (s)a 
Other private owners not from village (s)b 
Cooperative (s) 
AWRSP (ro) – one transaction 
Gmina (ro) – one transaction 
Private farmers (b + ri) 
P2 (former) Private farmers (s + ro) 
Other private owners not from village (ro) a 
AWRSP (s + ro) 
Gmina (ro) 
Private farmers (b + ri) 
Informal cooperation of private farmers (ri) 
Spanish company (b + ri) 
S  (former) Private farmers (s + ro) 
Other private owners not from village (s + ro) b 
Private farmers (b + ri) 
a For example, teachers or forest workers who were allocated land and sold or rented out 
b Usually heirs of former owners who live somewhere else 
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Table 2: Features of organisation and summary of their manifestation in villages 
P1, P2 and S 
Features of organisation P1 P2 S 
Common rules    
  - Passing of information Rental private: 
To 1 person from the 
community 
Sale private: 
To the community by 
word of mouth 
To 1 person from the 
community a 
Rental AWRSP/gmina: 
To the public through 
press 
To the public through 
information board 
Rental private: 
To 1 person from the 
community 
Sale private: 
To the community by 
word of mouth 
Rental AWRSP/gmina: 
To the public through 
press 
To the public through 
information board 
Rental private: 
To 1 person from the 
community 
Sale private: 
To 1 person from the 
community 
  - Control procedures Peer monitoring 
Word of mouth 
Peer monitoring 
Word of mouth 
Peer monitoring 
Word of mouth 
  - Sanctioning mechanisms Social sanctioning 
Self-enforcement 
Social sanctioning 
Self-enforcement 
Social sanctioning 
Self-enforcement 
Common objectives Keep land ownership 
within the community 
Limit competition to the 
community 
Restrict land prices 
Allowing land owner to 
profit by selecting best 
offer from within 
community 
Keep land ownership 
within the community 
Limit competition to the 
community 
Restrict land prices 
Allowing land owner to 
profit by selecting best 
offer from within 
community 
Keep land ownership 
within the community 
Limit competition even 
within the community 
Restrict land prices 
Impact of actors’ identity 
and constellation 
Control/sanctioning 
based on personal 
knowledge and  trust 
Non-private actors 
(AWRSP and gmina) 
introduce more 
competitive behaviour 
Control/sanctioning 
based on personal 
knowledge and  trust 
Non-private actors 
(AWRSP and gmina) 
introduce more 
competitive behaviour 
Control/sanctioning 
based on personal 
knowledge and  trust 
Only private actors, 
competition very limited 
 
a In one case private sale through press, which constituted a break of rules as reactions in the village showed. 
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